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I am honoured to deliver this year’s lecture to celebrate the memory of George Ernest
Morrison, an extraordinary adventurer, journalist and adviser to the Chinese government
who in his own inimitable way rendered great service to relations between China and
Australia. My wife, Charlotte Ikels, and I have discovered what you know – that the
pleasures of life in Australia are some of the world’s best kept secrets. We have enjoyed our
three weeks at The Australian National University, which has the world’s best journal of
contemporary China, the world’s best assemblage of Indonesia specialists, and a large
community of distinguished academic and government specialists on East and Southeast
Asia and the Western Pacific.
This evening I will discuss relations between China, Japan and the United States
since World War II. I will look at the three periods of critical changes in their relations –
1947 to 1951, 1969 to 1978 and 1989 to 1993 – before turning to consider in more detail the
three bilateral relationships in the current period of uncertainty. I draw heavily on a series of
conferences that I organized with Chinese scholars, led by Professor Yuan Ming of Peking
University, Japanese scholars, led by Professor Tanaka Akihiko of Tokyo University, and
Western scholars.
If I were talking about contemporary Europe, I might focus on the European Union
and NATO. Although ASEAN and APEC have contributed greatly to reducing tensions and
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increasing regional cooperation in Asia, in the decades immediately ahead these multilateral
institutions cannot become strong enough to respond to emergencies and maintain a
regional security framework. I will concentrate on what I believe to be the most critical
factor for maintaining regional stability in East Asia over the next few decades – the
relations between the three great powers in the region: China, Japan and the United States.
Their cooperation in regional and global organizations is a very important but somewhat
distinct topic that I will not try to cover tonight.
For the first time in modern history, Asia now has both a strong China and a strong
Japan. The United States is not an Asian country, but is deeply involved in Asian affairs. US
ships travelled to Asia even before America became a nation, and US territory has faced the
Pacific since early in the 19th century. Since 1941 the United States has made deep and
enduring security commitments to Asia, and since 1977 its trade across the Pacific has
surpassed its trade across the Atlantic.
China, Japan and the United States all have strong unique traditions and equally
strong national pride. The United States is, like Australia, a new nation formed from
immigrants. We have scarcely two centuries of history while Chinese and Japanese
civilizations count their history in millennia. China and the United States are large
continents with considerable cultural and ethnic diversity, while Japan is insular and
relatively homogeneous. The United States achieved modernization through private
enterprise and individual initiative under a democratically elected government, while Japan
and China made their breakthroughs to modernization through government planning,
strategic national investment and authoritarian leadership. The American nation was
democratic from the beginning; Japan has been transformed from an authoritarian state into
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a democracy. China, although increasingly open, pluralistic, market oriented and democratic
in the villages, is led by a small elite in the Communist Party. China and Japan are
neighbours, while the US capital is far away. The Chinese and Japanese languages are based
on Chinese characters, while the United States uses the alphabet. Although these three
countries are expanding their base of shared understanding, they have nothing comparable
to the common bond that European countries acquired from Roman law, the alphabet,
Christianity and centuries of relations between nation states.
1947–1951
It is remarkable how quickly and completely China and the United States, which had been
allied against a common enemy in World War II, became adversaries. In 1946–47, two
major related events occurred: the start of the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union, and the outbreak of the civil war between the Chinese nationalists and
Communists.
In retrospect it was perhaps not inevitable in 1946 that China and the United States
would become enemies. Both Western and Chinese historians have found turning points at
which leaders on both sides might have avoided all-out confrontation. Some Chinese
historians argue that if the United States had been more receptive, Mao Zedong might not
have leaned so heavily toward the Soviets. Some US historians argue that if Mao had
responded more positively to overtures from US Ambassador Leighton Stuart, the US
government might have retained working relations with the Communists. Had Mao not
entered the Korean War, the United States might not have protected Taiwan, and relations
with the United States could have resumed sooner. Had the UN troops in Korea not crossed
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the 38th parallel, and had the United Nations heeded China’s warnings about what would
happen if troops moved toward the Yalu, total confrontation with China might have been
avoided.
But the United States and the Chinese Communists had already been leaning away
from each other before 1947. Anti-Communism was strong in the United States even in
World War II when there was limited cooperation with the Soviet Union. Chinese
Communists strongly opposed imperialism and neo-imperialism even when they cooperated
with the nationalists and the United States. The Chinese Communists had worked with the
Russians since the early the 1920s, and in the 1930s and 1940s the United States had far
deeper relations with Chiang Kai-shek and his government than with the Communists.
No leaders took the key decisions that might have avoided confrontation between
China and the United States. Neither American nor Chinese leaders had the knowledge or
vision they acquired some two decades later to seek a way to cooperate against the Soviet
Union. With the entry of Chinese volunteers into the Korean War, the totalistic battle
between Communism and the “free world” was joined and was not to be concluded until
after 1969.
In 1947 the enmity between Japan and the United States changed with equal
rapidity. In 1945 the Allied Forces occupying Japan conceived the noble mission of
preventing another world war by making deeper and more fundamental changes than were
made after World War I. Believing that democracies do not cause war, they wanted to build
strong roots for democracy. The Allied Occupation decided that the role of the Emperor
would be only symbolic; the military would be disbanded; Diet members would be elected
democratically and have vastly increased powers; a peace constitution would be introduced;
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the zaibatsu (financial groups) that had provided the economic engine for militarism would
be split up; labour unions would be strengthened; and textbooks extolling militarism would
be replaced by others supporting democracy. It was the world’s most massive effort to
change a nation. For seven years, forces that at their peak included half a million troops
worked to strengthen democratic roots.
Having fought battles against fierce Japanese soldiers, the troops that first landed on
Japan still thought of the Japanese as the enemy. Many wanted to exact revenge for the
sneak attack on Pearl Harbour that had killed many of their fellow soldiers. But relations
between the Allied forces and the Japanese began to improve within months. The Japanese,
taught to expect that the occupying troops would rape their women and kill their children,
were surprised when the troops passed out sweets and chewing gum to Japanese children.
Western forces were surprised that an enemy they had seen as devious and villainous turned
out to be courteous, cooperative and sometimes even loyal. Many Japanese civilians who
had felt suppressed and deceived by their own military believed that the Allied Occupation
provided a chance for Japan to change, and that by cooperating with the Occupation they
could speed Japan’s recovery and the end of the Occupation.
But what really altered US–Japan government relations was the Cold War and Sino-
Soviet collaboration. In 1947, as George Kennan laid out the strategy for containing
Communism and as the Chinese Communists won crucial battles against the nationalists,
General MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo began to see that the Japanese might be useful
allies in the war against Communism. To be sure there were differences of views between
those who wanted to push to the hilt the purging of war-time leaders and the dismantling of
the zaibatsu and those who felt that moderation was required to give Japan the economic
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capacity to serve as a Western ally.
It is remarkable how rapidly US–Japan relations deepened between 1947 and 1951.
Having renounced the use of military means to achieve its ends, Japan did not send troops to
Korea but did provide logistical support, a wide variety of rear services and the transport of
supplies and personnel. This September Japan and the United States will celebrate the 50th
anniversary of the peace treaty that brought the Occupation to an end and structured an
alliance that has remained firm ever since, even after the end of the Cold War.
From 1951 to 1971, Japan tried to build up trade with China. In this aim it was
thwarted by US leaders who wanted to constrain trading with the enemy and by Chinese
leaders who would not permit deep economic ties without political ties. In order to maintain
the alliance with the United States, Japanese leaders were forced to limit trading and
political relations with China.
1969–1978
A key starting point of Chinese Communist Party foreign policy analysts has been to
identify the main enemy and then identify potential collaborators against that enemy. The
main enemy in World War II had been Japan, in 1947 it was the nationalists and after 1950
it was the United States. In 1969, after threats of invasion from the Soviet Union in two
border clashes, China concluded that Russia was its main enemy. The Chinese government
decided to improve relations with Western Europe, Australia, Canada, and even the United
States, to reduce the danger of Soviet attack.
Nixon and Kissinger, who could initially determine China policy with no
consultation, believed China could be a useful ally against the Soviet Union and could help
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resolve the Vietnam War. Thus began one of the most fascinating diplomatic efforts in the
latter half of the 20th century. Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger, backed by Mao and Nixon,
began to lay the basis for strategic cooperation against the Soviet Union.
When Kissinger secretly flew to China and announced that Nixon would soon visit,
Japan felt betrayed. Japan had, under US pressure, fought China’s entry to the United
Nations and restrained its trade with China. Now, without notifying Japan, US leaders were
rushing to Beijing. Japanese analysts explained that the hostilities between the two countries
in the 1930s had resulted from intense competition in the Chinese market and that
Kissinger’s secrecy was designed to give US business a head start as China began opening
up to the outside world. In fact Kissinger and Nixon in 1971 not only failed to notify the
Japanese, but they failed to notify their own State Department. The real reason they kept
their plans secret was because a leak might enable the Taiwan lobby in the United States,
working with Congress, to spoil plans for the visit. Nixon shrewdly calculated that the
excitement of his visit would pull Congress along and that with such firm anti-Communist
credentials he would not be accused, as the Democrats had been in the late 1940s, of being
soft on Communism.
Once Nixon’s visit was announced, Japan was no longer constrained from
improving its relations with China and sought to gain prompt access to the Chinese market.
Eisaku Sato, then the longest serving prime minister in Japanese post-war history, had such
bad relations with China that he could not have achieved rapprochement. Sato was promptly
dumped and replaced by a new prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei, who could work with
China. To make sure that Japan did not fall behind the United States in the Chinese market,
Japan completed the normalisation of relations with China in scarcely more than a year.
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There followed, from 1971 until 1989, an unusual period – the first time in history –
when all three nations enjoyed good relations with each other. Once a geopolitical strategy
brought them together, economic, cultural, academic and local community relations
between the three countries began to expand, slowly at first and then at an increased pace.
The growth of trust between China and the outside world paved the way for China’s
1978 policy of reform and opening. To advance modernisation China wanted a benign
trading environment in which it could acquire technology and management skills and
expand export markets. It is no accident that China announced this policy the same month
that China and the United States announced their agreement to normalise relations, and that
normalisation and China’s reform and opening both began in January 1979.
1989–1993
The basis for cordial relations between the three nations ended with the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. After China’s crackdown on the Tiananmen
Square democracy movement on 4 June 1989, the United States introduced sanctions and
relations deteriorated.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War terminated the
strategic rationale for the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese friendships. The end of the
Cold War also led to an increased assertion of US values in foreign policy. As Henry
Kissinger pointed out, US foreign policy has long involved some mixture of geopolitical
strategy and assertion of US values. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, had a tough-minded
geostrategic vision, and Woodrow Wilson asserted American values. During the Cold War,
many US liberals believed that supporting dictators to achieve geopolitical aims was a
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betrayal of US values. The collapse of the Cold War destroyed the rationale for supporting
dictators.
After the Tiananmen Incident, television viewers around the world came to think of
Chinese leaders as tyrants. China became the target of America’s new determination to
stand up for something it believed in.
The Japanese public was also upset by China’s crackdown on the protest movement
but was far less moralistic than the American public. Because of their own atrocities in
China, the Japanese knew they were not in a strong position to lecture China about morality.
Acutely aware of the costs of chaos, which they had witnessed in China in the 1930s,
Japanese leaders were sympathetic with Chinese desires for order. They also placed a higher
priority on economic interests. In response to global opinion, Japan did restrain trade and
technology transfers to China, but was more prepared than the United States to be
forthcoming to China.
The US president, George Bush, was more concerned with preserving working
relations with China than was the US public. In deference to public opinion, Bush was
overtly cool toward Chinese leaders, but quietly supportive of Japanese efforts to improve
relations with China. China was eager to reduce the sanctions on trade and technology
transfer, and saw an opportunity to weaken foreign constraints by expanding relations with
Japan. Thus while formal state-to-state relations between the United States and China were
on hold from 1989 until 1994, the relationship China had with Japan was far less affected.
In fact Japanese leaders decided this would be an opportune time for the Emperor to have a
safe and productive visit to China. The visit of Emperor Akihito in 1992 went well. His
carefully worded apologies appeared to lay the basis for continued good relations with
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China.
By 1994, however, as other countries began to resume relations with China, Japan
no longer had such a special role to play. The difficult issues that had troubled Sino-
Japanese relations, particularly Japan’s World War II record, came to the fore again.
The post-1993 period has been a less stable and more troubled time for relations
between all three countries. Let us examine each side of the triangle.
Sino-Japanese Relations
The tensions between Japan and China erupted most visibly in 1998 when President Jiang
Zemin visited Japan. The rare visit of the paramount Chinese leader could have been an
occasion for great strides in the relationship, as Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Japan had been in
late 1978. The foreign ministries of Japan and China tried to put a good spin on Jiang
Zemin’s visit, but in the media and among the public, especially in Japan, it was considered
a major failure. Why did the visit fail?
One reason was that it was such a striking contrast to the enormously successful
visit of Kim Dae Jong immediately preceding Jiang’s visit. Originally Jiang was scheduled
to visit Japan before Kim Dae Jong did, but China announced that because of serious
flooding at the time, Jiang Zemin felt he must postpone the visit. When he was in Japan,
Kim Dae Jong had an enormous impact on relations between Korea and Japan. Part of the
time he spoke in Japanese. He publicly thanked his Japanese friends who worked to save his
life when the Korean spy agency, the KCIA, kidnapped him in Japan and prepared to kill
him. He announced that it was time to look forward, not backward, and that Japanese and
Koreans must learn to work together. After this visit the Japanese public, as reflected in
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public opinion polls, considered Kim Dae Jong the greatest Asian leader of the time.
Although Japan’s occupation of Korea and the way Japanese textbooks treated this period
continued to stir feelings in Korea, attitudes and relations between the two countries
underwent a sea change as a result of Kim Dae Jong’s visit.
Jiang Zemin’s speeches in Japan a few weeks later reflected the bitter anger that
Chinese leaders and public feel about Japan’s failure to make a full accounting of its
atrocities. Jiang pointedly criticised Japanese political leaders who visited the Yasukuni
Shrine to pay respect for Japanese soldiers who died in the war. He repeatedly demanded
further apologies, even at a dinner given for him by Emperor Akihito. Jiang, who had not
been well briefed on Japanese attitudes, found out too late that the Japanese had became
increasingly annoyed with his attacks. His approach was a striking contrast with Kim Dae
Jong’s, who was ready to put the past behind him. The Japanese made a written apology to
Kim, but Prime Minister Obuchi decided not to offer Jiang a written apology – Obuchi’s
popularity in Japan shot up as a result.
The confrontation during Jiang Zemin’s visit was a culmination of issues that had
been simmering between China and Japan since 1993. From China’s perspective, Japan’s
failure to apologise for its war crimes, as Germany had done, heightened suspicions that
Japan was plotting to become a strong independent military power. The Chinese media
frequently denounced the speeches of right-wing Japanese politicians that belittled the
atrocities in Nanjing, the Japanese textbooks whitewashing Japanese aggression, and the
visits by Japanese politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine. In 1995, on the 50th anniversary of
the end of World War II, when the Chinese press ran a major campaign calling on the
Chinese people never to forget Japan’s atrocities, the Japanese became more pessimistic
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about the future of Sino-Japanese relations.
The decision by the United States and Japan to review and reaffirm their security
treaty in 1994–95 strengthened the belief of many Chinese that the two countries were
uniting against a rising China. These fears were heightened in 1996 when President Clinton
visited Japan to announce the reaffirmation of the treaty after the two years of intensive
discussions. Some Chinese think tanks argued that the Japan’s purpose was to acquire high-
level military technology from the United States in preparation for going independent
militarily. Chinese criticisms upset the Japanese and strengthened the hand of the small
group in Japan who wanted a stronger military.
Many Japanese business leaders, aware of Chinese sentiments, have made long-term
investments in China that had not been initially profitable. As investments became
profitable, local Chinese governments increased the zashui, literally miscellaneous taxes,
which some foreigners translate as extortion. When the Chinese government revised the
central tax code, reducing the capacity of local governments to give tax breaks, many
Japanese firms complained that local governments went back on promises about the size
and duration of tax holidays they had used to attract Japanese investment.
From Japan’s perspective, its generous aid packages to China, far larger than Japan
gave to any other country and far larger than any other country gave to China, were a partial
atonement for World War II atrocities and a substitute for reparations to which China had
renounced its claims. Some Chinese officials understood Japan’s generosity but it was not
communicated widely to the Chinese public. With China’s economy growing by
approximately 10 per cent a year and the Japanese economy stagnating, many Japanese have
wondered why they should continue to give aid. When China ignored Japanese requests to
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halt nuclear testing, Japan threatened to cut off aid until China stopped testing. The Chinese
government protested so vehemently that Japan reluctantly resumed aid, but before long
China stopped nuclear testing and signed the test ban treaty.
Japan’s willingness to take a “low posture” toward China began to change in the
mid-1990s. While older Japanese felt deep remorse about World War II, many younger
people wondered why they should be apologising again and again for something that
happened before they were born. The Dutch had done horrible things in Indonesia,
Americans had killed native Indians and the British had committed atrocities in their
colonies. World opinion no longer demanded that they continue to apologise. Why must
only Japan be asked to apologise? Many Japanese became cynical about Chinese demands,
viewing them as manipulations to whip up anti-Japanese feeling in China and elsewhere in
Asia or as a bargaining tool to obtain more aid, better terms for investment and greater
transfers of technology.
Even more importantly, changing Japanese attitudes to China reflected a reappraisal
of China’s potential. In the 1950s and 1960s, most Japanese did not share the belief of US
officials that China was enormously dangerous, for in the two previous decades they had
witnessed Chinese weaknesses – political and economic as well as military. As recently as
the late 1980s, Japanese businesspeople spoke with condescension about China’s economic
capacities. By the mid-1990s, after several years of double-digit Chinese economic growth,
Japan looked at China quite differently. For the first time in modern history, Japan could
imagine a powerful Chinese state with a powerful military. As the only major country that
had denounced its right to produce atomic weapons and develop offensive military
capacities, Japan could imagine China using military intimidation to achieve its political
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goals.
Japanese and Chinese perceptions of each other are not only shaped by their World
War II history and concerns about each other’s military capacity, but at a deeper level by
their historical views about their proper place in the world. The Chinese have long believed
China to be the great civilisation of Asia and that Japan is a less civilized offshoot. Japan’s
century of domination, beginning with its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, led
many in Japan to feel that the two countries’ positions on the hierarchy of civilizations have
been reversed. Many Chinese find Japanese successes and sense of superiority an affront.
China would now like to resume what it considers its rightful place as the leading
civilisation of Asia. This will require some adjustment on both sides.
Despite growing tensions, the trade, investment, cultural, academic and local
community exchanges between the two countries have continued to grow. Paradoxically,
economic and cultural relations are particularly strong in areas where Japanese imperialism
was deeply rooted – in the northeast, where Japanese imperialists established Manchukuo,
and in Shanghai, where they enjoyed the privileges of an international settlement. Local
community exchanges to preserve goodwill are sometimes less than open about annoyances
on both sides, but the vigour of these exchanges and the businesslike relations that go on
despite changes in the overall political mood, help provide a buffer during times of political
tension.
Sino-American Relations
In US presidential elections, the challenger attacks the incumbent party for its foreign
policies as well as for its domestic politics. US presidents have found they need to work
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with China, but because US attitudes to China have become more negative, they are accused
of being too close to China. In the 1992 presidential election, Bill Clinton challenged
President George Bush for coddling the “butchers of Beijing”. After becoming president,
Clinton initially remained true to his campaign rhetoric, announcing he would not grant
most-favoured-nation status to China the following year unless China made progress in
human rights. Soon Clinton realised, just as previous presidents had, that he needed China’s
cooperation on many issues, including trade, North Korea and nuclear proliferation. In May
1994, little more than a year after taking office, and despite a State Department report that
China’s had made no progress with human rights, the president announced the continuation
of China’s most-favoured-nation status. The policy of engagement with China that had
begun with President Nixon has continued almost uninterrupted for some three decades
because each president has recognized that it is in America’s national interest.
The drama of Tiananmen, China’s rapid growth and the realisation that China may
within decades be the world’s second-largest economy, with a strong military, have made
China a salient issue in US politics. China has become a lightning rod for human rights
organizations, anti-abortion groups and labour unions, to say nothing of the Tibetan and
Taiwan lobbies.
The anti-China coalition in US politics has brought together strange bedfellows. On
the left are those critical of China’s human rights record, of its oppression of Tibetan and
other minorities and of its labour practices. On the other end of the spectrum is the Christian
right that opposes Chinese abortion practices and its restrictions on Christians and
missionaries, the Taiwan lobby, the Tibetan lobby and those who stand for a strong US
defence posture. Many of these groups are relatively small but determined single-issue
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lobbies. The American business community has so many interests it cannot focus on China
all the time, but when a major issue comes to the fore, it can be very effective in mobilising
strong political support. On the two big issues it has really cared about in the past decade –
the continuation of China’s most-favoured-nation status in 1994 and China’s entry to the
World Trade Organization in 2000 – it rallied support and easily defeated the coalition of
small anti-Chinese pressure groups.
For the Chinese government, the main issue in the bilateral relationship has been US
support for Taiwan. Without America’s support, Taiwan is much more likely to work out an
agreement with the mainland. With its support, Taiwan might gain the confidence to declare
independence, a possibility totally unacceptable to China’s most fundamental instincts about
nationhood. The totalitarian military style of Chiang Kai-Shek and his son Chiang Ching-
Kuo had never endeared these leaders to US liberals, but by 1987, as opposition parties
were allowed and military emergency rules were abolished, US opinion toward Taiwan
greatly improved. After the Tiananmen Incident two years later, the contrast between
Taiwanese democracy and mainland totalitarianism gave Taiwan great leverage in US
public opinion.
After Lee Teng-Hui became Taiwan’s first locally born president, he began pushing
for more independence and greater international recognition. Mainland Chinese feared that
the United States would alter its acknowledgment of the “one China” principle and provide
security to Taiwan, allowing it to declare independence. Since the normalisation of their
relations in 1979, China and the United States had an understanding that high-level Taiwan
officials would not be allowed to visit the United States. When the US government allowed
President Lee Teng-Hui to stop in Hawaii on transit to Mexico in May 1994, it imposed
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such severe constraints on his activity that Lee used the occasion to generate enormous
sympathy from the US public. The next year the US Congress almost unanimously
supported Lee’s visit to his alma mater, Cornell. The Chinese government expressed grave
concern about the growth of the Taiwan independence movement, and to show its
seriousness shot missiles off the coast of Taiwan. The United States, convinced that its
credibility as a defender of Asian security would be at risk if it did not respond, sent two
aircraft carrier task forces to the vicinity of Taiwan. This incident forced both China and the
United States to consider seriously the consequences of collision. Broad consultations
followed, and the relationship reached new heights when President Clinton visited China for
nine days in 1998.
Despite the warming of the relationship at the official level, US domestic criticism
of Chinese human rights practices continued. Views of China were reinforced when the Cox
Committee made allegations of Chinese thefts of US military technology. When the United
States bombed Kosovo, China was very concerned that the reason given – domestic
suppression of minorities – could be used to justify military action against China for its
suppression of the Tibetans. Thus China’s mood was already very tense when the United
States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade – a bombing Americans cannot believe
was intentional and the Chinese cannot believe was accidental.
Tensions revived after George W. Bush became president. The Chinese, already
concerned by his campaign rhetoric that China should be treated as a competitor, were upset
by his approval of substantial military sales to Taiwan, his announcement that he would do
what was necessary to support Taiwan, and his plans for missile defence systems. The mid-
air collision between a US spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan island in April
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provoked strong patriotic responses both in China and the United States.
In the past decade, China has continued to expand domestic freedoms and the rule of
law. US criticism of China’s human rights violations, its policy on Taiwan or Tibet and its
treatment of religious groups has at times protected individual Chinese under attack from
their government but is more often counterproductive in pushing the Chinese government to
crack down further to prevent further opposition.
In short, the end of geopolitical cooperation, the crackdown in Tiananmen Square,
and the sustained growth that has created visions of Chinese power has led to a new uneasy
period after the long period of positive relations between 1971 and 1989. The mutual
worries and frustrations have restricted the improvement of relations, but the recognition of
deep common interests in an increasingly interdependent world has thus far placed limits on
the deterioration of relations.
US–Japan Relations
In the 1990s economic tensions between Japan and the United States have been greatly
reduced. In the late 1980s, the Japanese economy seemed so vigorous that Japanese were
buying up property around the world and challenging the United States’ dominance in high
technology. Many Americans, not only manufacturers and bankers, but the American
public, feared America’s position would be overtaken by Japan. This fear was reflected in
the antagonism between US and Japanese trade negotiators.
By the early 1990s, US automotive and semiconductor industries had regained their
momentum, the US software industry had extended its global leadership and Japan’s
economy was sliding deeper into the doldrums. The fear of Japanese economic power
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subsided and so did the depth of sentiment toward what were considered unfair Japanese
trade practices. Furthermore, these trade issues were increasingly being taken up in
multilateral trade negotiations, reducing the pressure on bilateral negotiations.
In 1994, as the Japanese government started the planning cycle for its next mid-term
defence plan and began discussing the revision of the security guidelines, Japanese officials
were very troubled because US commitments were unclear and they feared that the United
States, which had already weakened its commitments after the end of the Vietnam War,
would continue to pull out forces. Japanese officials began to consider hedging their bets,
and some US officials were concerned that Japan might assume it could no longer count on
US forces and speed up its independent capacities, weakening the alliance.
In 1994 there was also an urgent reason to solidify US–Japan security cooperation.
The United States was putting pressure on North Korea to close its nuclear reprocessing
facilities, and North Korea was threatening a military response. The United States and Japan
therefore intensified their security discussions, not only on how to respond to the North
Korean threat, but also on how to establish a long-term security framework for Asia. These
talks involved Japanese and US defence and foreign relations specialists at various levels in
the government. Early in autumn 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Defence
Secretary William Perry met with their Japanese counterparts and confirmed a security
alliance that would remain robust. The new rationale was not to prepare for an enemy but to
provide regional stability and to respond to emergencies such as terrorism and piracy. In the
spring of 1996, President Clinton travelled to Tokyo to formalize the agreements reached at
the lower levels. Even though Japanese politics in the 1990s was in a state of flux, the
commitment to the security alliance across the political spectrum was adequate to provide
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the necessary political underpinnings.
Japan announced that its forces would continue to be strictly defensive, but that the
defence perimeter would be widened to include the area surrounding Japan. Advances in
missile technology have meant that effective defence will require interception before
missiles hit Japan. In the Korean War, Japan transported supplies and forces to Korea, but
since then it has been unclear what role Japan would play in an emergency on the Korean
peninsula. The new risks of conflict in the region have led Japan to clarify its role in the
region in such an emergency.
In the Gulf War, oil-dependent Japan was severely criticized for being slow in
supporting the United States. In the late 1980s, particularly, when the Japanese economy
was strong, the US public would not have tolerated the risking of US lives in a conflict,
especially in Asia, if Japan’s only contribution was financial. This mobilized Japan into
contributing to UN peacekeeping forces, but it remains reluctant to send troops abroad.
In the US–Japan security dialogues in 1994–96, the only discussion involving China
concerned how to bring it into a cooperative framework for regional security. There was no
discussion about how to respond to China as an enemy. It is true that in the 1990s, Japan has
grown increasingly uneasy about the expansion of Chinese military capacities. When
President Clinton visited China in 1998 without stopping in Japan, and without mentioning
the relationship with Japan while in China, many feared that the United States was allying
with China instead of Japan. Weak US reaction to North Korean missile launchings added
to Japanese fears of abandonment.
Japan’s uneasiness about America’s long-term intentions and increasing Chinese
military capacities has been compounded by its own domestic political and economic
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gridlock. Japan is still the dominant economy in Asia, whether measured by gross national
product, technological development, overseas investment, foreign trade or participation in
international economic and financial gatherings. But the Japanese are growing increasingly
concerned about the prospects for domestic industries, as Japanese companies shift
production to lower-cost destinations in China, including production in heavy industry and
high technology. The success of scientists of Chinese ancestry working abroad but keeping
in touch with scientists in China, and the expansion of research centres and scientific
training programs in China, have heightened Japanese concerns about their capacity to
compete in the long run.
When the new US administration announced increased emphasis on US–Japan
relations, many Japanese worried that high US expectations of Japan might lead to
disappointment with Japan’s inability to overcome domestic political gridlock on key
issues. Some Japanese remain concerned that America’s efforts to increase Japan’s
participation in the missile defence system could cause problems for its relationship with
China. But they appreciate that the increased attention from high-level US officials and
expanded dialogue has reduced the expectation gap by lowering US hopes that Japan will
expand its contribution to regional and global security.
Prospects
You might argue that I have been describing not a triangle but three separate bilateral
relationships. This may be a fair characterisation, for until now most officials in the three
countries have thought bilaterally. But I hope it is clear from my comments that the fates of
the three countries are interlinked and that we need to give more thought to the triangle.
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The visits of President Clinton to Japan in 1996 and to China in 1998 illustrate the
problems of thinking only bilaterally. Clinton’s visit to Japan caused anxieties in China and
his visit to China caused anxieties in Japan, making cooperation on key issues more
difficult. More high-level consultations should have been held with the other nation before
and after the visits.
Issues concerning the Korean peninsula will require close consultation between
Russia and many other regional powers but especially between these three powers. If
tensions on the peninsula continue to ease, a key issue will be the decrease of US forces in
Korea and Japan. If the United States can maintain good relations with China as North
Korea opens up, it should be possible to continue a US force structure in Korea and Japan
that China would not consider threatening.
Missile defence will be a key issue in the years ahead as technology moves from
research and development to deployment. It is unrealistic to expect that technological
advances will be halted. Any American leader, confronted with the question of whether to
invest in a technology that can help defend the American people, is likely to make the
investment if the technology is promising. For China, a missile defence system would be
anathema if it gave Taiwan the assurance that it could go independent or if it persuaded the
United States that the existence of Chinese missiles could no longer deter US attacks on
China. If China feels confident of its ability to deter Taiwan from declaring independence
and the United States from launching attacks on China, then limited missile defence systems
could help stabilise the region. If not, then China is likely to speed up weapons
development, and Japan may then respond, leading to an unstable and therefore highly
dangerous arms race. It follows that it is critical to work out arrangements where both China
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and Japan can feel confident of their capacity to deter outside threats.
Some of the greatest threats to rational foreign policy arise from domestic politics in
each country. China is confronted with 100 million migrants, a growing body of
unemployed workers laid off from state enterprises, public outrage at corruption and weak
welfare nets. Leaders who worry about keeping public order and who know that ideology
has lost its unifying force may be tempted to sir up anti-foreign, nationalist feelings.
Sophisticated Chinese media managers no longer need to rely on crude anti-foreign
denunciations. They can fan the fires of nationalism simply by widely circulating outrageous
statements by US Congress members and quotations from Japanese textbooks that belittle
atrocities against China. Thus far China has been restrained in criticizing the new Bush
administration’s sales of weapons to Taiwan, its plans for missile defence, and Bush’s
announcement that he would do what is necessary to defend Taiwan, but it is unclear how
long the restraint will continue.
In the United States, concern about China’s growing military capacities, its spying
on US high technology, the jailing and execution of dissidents and members of religious
groups, and crackdowns in Tibet can mobilize US public opinion, especially if combined
with dramatic television footage. When coordination with other countries seems slow, US
leaders confident about US military and technological superiority may be tempted to make
unilateral decisions that respond to the public mood.
Japanese politicians, frustrated at continued Chinese criticism and the excessive
presence of US military bases, are tired of taking a low posture to China and the United
States. Will constitutional revision and continued Chinese military build-up lead Japan to
expand its military capacity or to go nuclear? Will continued political gridlock and
24
economic stagnation cause the Japanese public to turn to outspoken anti-foreign leaders
such as Ishihara Shintaro?
The danger is that domestic political extremism in one country could stimulate
extremist responses in the other countries and spiral out of control.
What are the chances that these domestic problems could lead to instability and
conflict between the three powers? I believe the risk is small. Chinese leaders have learned
the lesson of 1919 when massive demonstrations against Japan turned quickly to
demonstrations against the government for its inability to stand up against Japan. They are
likely to work to keep domestic protests in bound. Even young Japanese know where
militarism led Japan in the 1930s and where good foreign relations and access to global
markets brought them after the war. In the United States, democratic forces may be slow to
respond to excesses, but the capacity of informed government officials, intellectuals, the
business community and national politics to counter extremism remain strong.
On many issues the interests of China, Japan and the United States are alike,
providing powerful motivation for leaders pursuing their national interests to work together.
All three countries need stability to boost economic investment and trade and build
cooperation for controlling environmental degradation, counteracting terrorism, smuggling
and piracy, limiting proliferation and maintaining regional peacekeeping. Leaders of these
countries acting rationally are likely to continue to work together to maintain stability while
building a stronger regional order.
The challenge for the US–China–Japan triangle is to create the positive synergy that
the three nations enjoyed from 1971 to 1989, in the absence of a common enemy. The
United States and Japan should use their alliance to expand trust and cooperation with
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China so that all three powers can adjust and share responsibility as China continues to
grow and as its role continues to expand.
It is now a different era than in 1971–89. No longer can a small number of leaders
make key decisions without broader public discussion. I am optimistic that the three
countries can achieve this synergy, not only because it is in each country’s interests. I am
optimistic because I believe that businesspeople and academics in the three countries can
help shape public opinion and help overcome the narrow domestic political pressures that
have the potential to pull us apart. But there are still enough risks that we need all the
assistance we can get, from public and private sources, and from large nations and small.
